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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 1999-2000
U.S. SUPREME COURT TERM
CHRISTOPHER E. SMrH*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the U.S. Supreme Court's 1998-99 Term, the number of
criminal justice cases decided by the Court declined in conjunction with
a decline in the total number of cases decided by the Justices.' After
deciding thirty and thirty-five criminal justice cases for 1996-972 and
1997-983 respectively, the Court decided only twenty-two such cases in
1998-99.4 The pattern shifted during the 1999-2000 Term. Despite
issuing opinions in only seventy-four cases, the fewest decisions in
nearly fifty years, 5 the number of criminal justice decisions increased to
thirty-one. 6 Noticeable changes in the Court's attentiveness to specific
issues may provide evidence that certain Justices are succeeding in their
efforts to shape the Court's role or agenda. 7 However, there is no
indication that increased attention to criminal justice can be attributed to
* Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., 1980, Harvard
University, M.Sc., 1981, University of Bristol (England); J.D., 1984, University of Tennessee; Ph.D.,
1988, University of Connecticut.
1. See Linda Greenhouse, The Justices Decide Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, 4
(Week in Review), at 1 ("The Court did not make many decisions: only 75, half the number of cases
decided each Term in the mid-1980s, and the June 23 end of the Term was the earliest closing date in
30 years.").
2. Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1996-97 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 29, 33 tl.l (1997).
3. Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1997-98 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 23 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 443, 443 (1999).
4. Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1998-99 U.S. Supreme Court Term, WIDENER J.
PuB. L. (forthcoming 2001).
5. Marcia Coyle, A Small, Potent Docket, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at Al.
6. This study includes a few cases that other analysts categorize as primarily concerning issues
other than criminal law and procedure. For example, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000),
garnered justifiable attention as the latest indicator of the Rehnquist Court's stance on abortion, see,
e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rulings on Abortion and Grandparents' Visitation, NAT'L L.J. Aug. 7, 2000, at
A26. The narrow five-to-four decision struck down Nebraska's "partial birth abortion" law. See
Stenberg, 120 S. Ct. at 2598. In this article, it is counted as a case about criminal justice decisions
because it concerned the constitutional validity of a criminal statute. Similarly, Los Angeles Police
Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999), and Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct.
2480 (2000), are classified as constitutional law cases concerning the First Amendment. This study
includes them among criminal justice-related cases because Los Angeles Police Department
concerned a law limiting access to police records, and Hill concerned a criminal statute addressing
leafleting outside abortion clinics.
7. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia has long argued that federal courts should reduce their
involvement in various kinds of cases, see Stuart Taylor, Jr., Scalia Proposes Major Overhaul of U.S.
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1987, 1 (National Desk), at 1, and uses concepts such as standing and
justiciability to keep the U.S. Supreme Court from considering various issues, see RICHARD A. B RISBtN,
JR., JusTicE ANTONIN SCALIA AND TE CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 328 (1997),
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anything other than unpredictable patterns of particular cases brought to
the Court each year and the Justices' inclinations to tackle specific
issues.
Analysts argue that the Rehnquist Court has continued the Burger
Court's "'counterrevolution' in due process jurisprudence brought
about by dramatic changes in the Court's personnel and by society's
response to [a perceived] explosion of violent and drug-related crime."'8
It has also been asserted that the Rehnquist Court Justices may lack
understanding about and sensitivity to the operations and impacts of the
criminal justice process because none of these justices ever had the
experience of representing a defendant in a felony case. 9 Despite these
concerns, an analysis of the Court's civil liberties decisions concluded
that "[l]ittle evidence existed in the 1995 and 1996 Terms of the conser-
vative constitutional counterrevolution envisaged by Presidents Reagan
and Bush when they appointed a majority of the current members of the
Court."10 The Court's decisions have been predominantly conserva-
tive, 11 but many of the Warren Court's landmark civil liberties prece-
dents1 2 have never been overturned.1 3 The 1999-2000 Term presented
opportunities for changes because the Justices accepted cases that pro-
vided vehicles to potentially eliminate such iconic decisions as Miranda
v. Arizonal4 and Terry v. Ohio. 15
This article will explore the Supreme Court's impact on criminal
justice during the 1999-2000 Term through an empirical examination of
the Court's decision-making processes and a review of the cases. In the
final analysis, the Supreme Court's 1999-2000 decisions affecting
criminal justice were consistent with previously established patterns in the
Rehnquist Court's decision making: conservative outcomes were pre-
dominant but the Court's decisions preserved landmark precedents and
favored the rights of individuals in some important cases.
8. JOHN C. DOMINO, CIVIL RIGHTS & LIBERTIES: TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 132 (1994).
9. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., The Supreme Court's Experience Gap, 82 JUDICATURE 251 (1999).
10. THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, SUPREME COURT UPDATE: 1997,
at 13 (1998).
11. Id. at5.
12. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
13. See Rudolph Alexander, Jr., The Mapp, Escobedo, and Miranda Decisions: Do They Serve a
Liberal or a Conservative Agenda, 4 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 39 (1990) (describing the Warren Court's
controversial, landmark precedents).
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), directly addressed
the question of whether the warnings required by Miranda are mandated by the Constitution.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), and Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266
(2000), both examined the continuing vitality of the requirement in Terry that certain prerequisites
exist before police officers may stop and frisk people on the streets.
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II. EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION MAKING
In several tables presented to illuminate the Supreme Court's
decision-making patterns during the 1999-2000 Term, the terms "liber-
al" and "conservative" are used as a convenient shorthand to describe
the outcomes supported by individual Justices and the Court majority.
These labels can be problematic as consistently applicable classifying
categories. 16 Indeed, the labels are problematic for some criminal justice
cases during the most recent Term. 17 However, the use of such cate-
gories is consistent with prior empirical studies of the Supreme Court
and enhances scholars' ability to make systematic comparisons of
different Court Terms and eras. Here the definitions of liberal and
conservative are modeled on the classifications in the Supreme Court
Judicial Data Base in which "[1]iberal decisions in the area of civil liber-
ties are pro-person accused or convicted of a crime, pro-civil liberties or
civil rights claimant, pro-indigent, pro-[Native American], and anti-
government in due process and privacy."'18 By contrast, "conservative"
decisions in criminal justice cases favor the government's interests in
prosecuting and punishing offenders over recognition or expansion of
rights for individuals.
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the Supreme Court's 1999-
2000 decisions according to the Court's vote totals and the direction of
the Court's decisions. Consistent with the post-Warren-era Supreme
16. Although the term "liberal" is used to describe outcomes in which Justices favor individuals'
rights over the interests of government, there are some kinds of rights in which Justices with so-called
conservative values are more likely to favor individuals. For example, cases concerning property
rights often produce role reversals among the Justices considered "liberal" and those considered
"conservative," with the usual liberals supporting the government's authority to regulate property and
usual conservatives supporting individuals' property rights. Such a role reversal occurred, for ex-
ample, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Despite the problems in
applying these terms to all kinds of issues, the liberal label is typically reserved for those Justices
supporting the claims of individuals, and such support can often appear to reflect a particular Justices'
values because of consistencies in their patterns of decision making. For example, Justices William
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall earned their "liberal" labels by supporting individuals' claims in civil
rights and liberties cases nearly ninety percent of the time during their service in the Rehnquist Court
era. See THOMAS R. HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME
COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHrTS AND LIBERTIES 57, 61 (1997).
17. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia is regarded as conservative because he is one of the
Justices least likely to support individuals' claims of right. See, e.g., DAVID A. ScHULrz & CHRISTOPHER
E. SMITH, T HE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA, at xii-xvii (1996). Similarly, Justice
Clarence Thomas is often regarded as "a consistent member of the Court's most conservative wing."
Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A Distinctive Justice, 28 SEroN HALL L. REV. 1, 2 (1997).
Yet, despite their records, Scalia and Thomas were the lone "liberals" in Fischer v. United States, 529
U.S. 667 (2000), who favored the defendant's interpretation of a federal bribery statute.
18. Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts:
Results from the Supreme Court Judicial Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 103 (1989).
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Court's prior record and reputation, the decisions predominantly
favored the government 19 although a notable percentage of decisions
favored individuals (38.7%). The table shows a lack of consensus
among the Justices concerning criminal justice issues. In the 1995-96
and 1996-97 Terms, nearly half of all criminal justice decisions were
unanimous, 2 0 but in 1997-98 and 1998-99 unanimous decisions
dropped to a level closer to forty percent. 21 In the 1999-2000 Term, the
level of consensus was similar to the preceding two Terms. Only nine
out of thirty-one cases were unanimous. These nine cases were divided
nearly evenly between liberal (4) and conservative (5) outcomes. By con-
trast, when there was disagreement among the Justices, conservative out-
comes predominated. Fourteen of twenty-two nonunanimous decisions
favored the government.
Table 1--Case Distribution by Vote and Liberal/Conservative Outcome
in U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Justice Decisions, 1999-2000 Term
Vote Liberal Conservative Total
9-0 4 5 9
8-1 1 1 2
7-2 3 3 6
6-3 1 3 4
5-4 3 7 10
TOTAL 12(39%) 19(61%) 31
One of the most striking aspects of the cases that deeply divided the
Court was the consistency of the composition of the opposing sides in
each case. All seven of the conservative 5-to-4 decisions were decided
by a majority coalition of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy squaring off against the consistent
dissenters Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer. 22 In one of the
19. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 190 (3d ed. 1989).
The Supreme Court of the 1970s was distinctly more conservative than the Warren Court
that preceded it, and the Court of the 1980s has been even more so.... [T]he Court has
cut back some rights that were established by the Warren Court, especially in criminal
procedure-the area in which its conservatism has been strongest.
Id.
20. In 1995-96, 11 out of 22 criminal justice decisions were unanimous, Christopher E. Smith,
Criminal Justice and the 1995-96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 4 (1996),
and in 1996-97, 13 out of 30 criminal justice decisions were unanimous, Smith, supra note 2, at 33.
21. In 1997-98, only 13 out of 35 criminal justice decisions were unanimous. Smith, supra note 3,
at 445.
22. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000); Ramdass
v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000); Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000); Smith v. Robbins, 528
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liberal 5-to-4 decisions, O'Connor deserted her usual allies to provide
the fifth vote that gave the more liberal foursome a majority. 23 The
other split decisions with liberal outcomes saw Scalia and Thomas join
three more liberal Justices and either Ginsburg or Breyer join the conser-
vative wing in dissent. 24 The number of cases that deeply divided the
Justices (i.e., one-third of criminal justice decisions) and the consistency
of the competing coalitions highlight the possibility that President
George W. Bush may influence decisions affecting a variety of issues if
given the opportunity to replace any Justices who leave the Court in the
near future.
For the second time in five years, the Court decided more constitu-
tional criminal justice issues than nonconstitutional issues. Unlike the
preceding year in which fifty-five percent of the criminal justice cases
presented constitutional issues (as compared with the thirty-four to
forty-five percent constitutional issue caseload among criminal justice
cases in the prior three Terms), 25 the percentage of constitutional issues
jumped to nearly sixty-five percent.
U.S. 259 (2000); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
23. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
24. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
25. The Court decided 45% constitutional issues among criminal justice cases in 1995-96, Smith,
supra note 20, at 5-6, 43% constitutional issues in 1996-97, Smith, supra note 2, at 34, and 34%
criminal justice issues in 1997-98, Smith, supra note 3, at 446; Smith, supra note 4.
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Table 2-Issues in Criminal Justice Cases in the Supreme Court's
1999-2000 Term26
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (64.5%) OTHER ISSUES (35.5%)
Due Process Habeas Corpus
United States v. Martinez-Salazar Ramdass v. Angelone
Apprendi v. New Jersey Williams v. Taylor
Edwards v. Carpenter
Slack v. McDaniel
First Amendment Federal Criminal Law
L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp. Fischer v. United States
Hill v. Colorado Jones v. United States
Castillo v. United States
Carter v. United States
Search and Seizure Interstate Detainers
Illinois v. Wardlow New York v. Hill
Florida v. J.L.
Bond v. United States
Self-Incrimination Sentencing Statutes
United States v. Hubbell United States v. Johnson
Johnson v. United States
Capital Jury Instructions
Weeks v. Angelone
Confrontation
Portuondo v. Agard
Right to Counsel
Martinez v. Court of Appeal
Smith v. Robbins
Roe v. Flores-Ortega
Williams v. Taylor
Sixth Amendment Trial Rights
Ohler v. United States
Ex Post Facto
Garner v. Jones
Carmell v. Texas
Miranda Warnings
Dickerson v. United States
Privacy
Stenberg v. Carhart
Separation of Powers
Miller v. French
26. The citations to the cases included in the table are as follows: United States v. Martinez-
Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); Ramdass v. Angelone,
530 U.S. 156 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446
(2000); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting
Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999); Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Fischer v. United
States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); Castillo v. United States, 530
U.S. 120 (2000); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119
(2000); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); New York v.
Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000); United States v. Hubbell, 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000); United States v. Johnson,
529 U.S. 53 (2000); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225
(2000); Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000); Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152 (2000);
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000); Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000); Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244
(2000); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000); Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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In theory, the Court's attention is drawn to unsettled or emerging
areas of law when it grants writs of certiorari to accept cases for
hearing. 27 During this Term, however, one might conclude that
persistent problems rather than emerging issues defined the Court's
criminal docket. For example, the number of cases concerning the right
to counsel plus an additional related case among those in the habeas
corpus category 28 reflect continuing questions about the quality and
effectiveness of defense counsel. 29
Table 3 shows the liberal/conservative voting patterns of individual
Justices for the 1999-2000 Term. Chief Justice Rehnquist emerged as
the Justice least likely to support individuals' claims in criminal justice
cases during the most recent Term. Justices Stevens and Souter stood
out as the strongest supporters of individual rights in criminal justice
cases, although Justice Ginsburg was nearly as liberal in the Term's
criminal justice cases. Ginsburg had been regarded as an outspoken
defender of constitutional rights during her pre-judicial career as a
lawyer, 30 but on the U.S. Supreme Court her early voting record earned
her the "characterization . . . as a judicial moderate." 3 1 Ginsburg's
level of support for individuals' claims in two earlier Terms' criminal
justice cases, forty-five percent (1995-96)32 and fifty-three percent
(1996-97),33 cast her as a moderate near the middle of the Court.
Ginsburg's increase in support for individuals during 1997-98 (60%),34
1998-99 (68%),35 and 1999-2000 (68%) may be attributable either to
27. See BAUM, supra note 19, at 96.
[The Supreme Court's] Rule 17 proclaims some of the conditions under which the Court
will hear a case. The rule emphasizes the Court's role in enhancing the certainty and
consistency of the law: The criteria it lists for accepting a case include the existence of
important legal issues that the Court has not yet decided, conflict among courts of appeals
on a legal question, conflict between a lower court and the Supreme Court's prior
decisions, and departure "from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" in
the courts below.
Id.
28. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000).
29. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
30. See Joyce Ann Baugh, Christopher E. Smith, Thomas R. Hensley, & Scott Patrick Johnson,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1994).
31. HENSLEY, SMITH & BAUGH, supra note 16, at 81.
32. Smith, supra note 20, at 6.
33. Smith, supra note 2, at 37.
34. Smith, supra note 3, at 450.
35. Smith, supra note 4.
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changes in her attitudes and voting strategies 36 or to a change in the mix
of criminal justice cases presented to the Supreme Court.37
Previously, the mix of issues facing the Court moved Justice Brey-
er's level of support for individuals from fifty-one percent in 1997-9838
to forty-five percent in 1998-99,39 thereby creating a more strongly
conservative-oriented split between the six Justices who supported indivi-
duals in forty-five percent or less of criminal justice cases (Rehnquist,
Thomas, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer) and the three Justices
who supported individuals in sixty-four to seventy-three percent of such
cases (Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens). In 1999-2000, there was clearer
differentiation between the Court's two wings. The five most conserva-
tive Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy) were
clustered between twenty-three percent and thirty-six percent. Justice
Breyer, the Justice who arguably defined the "center" of the Court for
criminal justice cases, was clearly differentiated from the conservatives
by supporting individuals in an additional twenty percent of cases
(55%). However, Breyer was similarly differentiated from the remaining
three Justices who were even more liberal at sixty-eight to seventy-one
percent support for individuals.
36. Justices' decisions about how to vote in Supreme Court cases are largely attributable to their
values and attitudes and to the strategic choices they make to persuade colleagues or advance
particular doctrines. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHoIcEs JusTICES MAKE 10 (1998).
37. Thomas R. Hensley & Christopher E. Smith, Membership Change and Voting Change: An
Analysis of the Rehnquist Court's 1986-1991 Terms, 48 POL. REs. Q. 837, 852-54 (1995).
38. Smith, supra note 3, at 450.
39. Smith, supra note 4.
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Table 3-Individual Justices' Liberal/Conservative Voting Percentages in
U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Justice Decisions, 1999-2000 Term
JUSTICE LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
Rehnquist 22.6% (7) 77.4% (24)
O'Connor 32.3% (10) 67.7% (21)
Thomas 32.3% (10) 67.7% (21)
Scalia 32.3% (10) 67.7% (21)
Kennedy 35.5% (11) 64.5% (20)
Breyer 54.8% (17) 45.2% (14)
Ginsburg 67.7% (21) 32.3% (10)
Souter 71.0% (22) 29.0% (9)
Stevens 71.0% (22) 29.0% (9)
The philosophical differences between the Justices become accentu-
ated when the analytical focus is limited to nonunanimous decisions.4 0
As indicated in Table 4, the Justices were clustered into two groups with
Breyer occupying the middle territory.
Table 4-Individual Justices' Liberal/Conservative Voting Percent-
ages in Nonunanimous U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Justice Decisions,
1999-2000 Term
JUSTICE LIBERAL CONSERVATIVE
Rehnquist 13.6% (3) 86.4% (19)
O'Connor 27.3% (6) 72.7% (16)
Thomas 27.3% (6) 72.7% (16)
Scalia 27.3% (6) 72.7% (16)
Kennedy 31.8% (7) 68.2% (15)
Breyer 59.1% (13) 40.9% (9)
Ginsburg 77.3% (17) 22.7% (5)
Souter 81.8% (18) 18.2% (4)
Stevens 81.8% (18) 18.2% (4)
40. On an en banc court, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, individual judicial officers may feel
freest to express their disagreements with the majority. When the decision makers split, their
disagreements should genuinely reflect the nature and strength of their differences. By contrast, on a
three-member appellate panel, a potential dissenter may be deterred by the thought that he or she must
dissent alone and carry the entire burden of presenting a dissenting opinion. Christopher E. Smith,
Polarization and Change in the Federal Courts: En Banc Decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74
JUDICATURE 133, 134 (1990).
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Table 5 shows an analysis of interagreement between individual
Justices on the Supreme Court. Such interagreement tables are used to
detect the existence of voting blocs on the high Court.41 Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg formed the only strong voting bloc that contained
more members than the various pairs of Justices who voted together with
regularity. Although there were conservative voting blocs for criminal
justice cases in various preceding terms, 42 the last time a three- or
four-member liberal voting bloc was evident was during the 1996-97
Term. 43 Apparently the mix of issues considered by the Court in its
most recent Term polarized the Court sufficiently to produce a liberal
voting bloc. Yet the mix of issues did not generate enough agreement
among the Justices who are consistently conservative to lead them to vote
in a way that met the criteria for a voting bloc.
Table 5-Interagreement Percentages for Paired Justices in U.S.
Supreme Court Unanimous Criminal Justice Decisions, 1999-2000
Term44
outer 96.8 93.5 83.9 61.3 51.6 51.6 48.4 41.9
insburg 90.3 80.6 64.5 54.8 54.8 45.2 38.7
tevens 83.9 61.3 58.1 51.6 48.4 41.9
reyer 71.0 61.3 58.1 51.6 51.6
Connor 74.2 90.3 74.2 67.7
sennedy 87.1 77.4 71.0
ehnquist 77.4 71.0
homas 93.5
A focus on nonunanimous decisions generates more pronounced
differences between the Justices, but the voting blocs maintain a similar
composition. Interestingly, although Rehnquist had the most conserva-
tive record and Souter and Stevens had the most liberal records, the
Justices most likely to disagree with each other were Scalia and
Ginsburg.
41. In empirical studies of the Supreme Court, voting blocs are determined according to the
"Sprague Criterion." The Sprague Criterion is calculated by subtracting the average agreement score
for the entire Court from 100. The resulting number is divided by two and added to the Court average
in order to establish the threshold level for defining a bloc. A bloc exists when the individual
agreement scores for a set of Justices exceed the threshold established by the Sprague Criterion
calculation. JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATrERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 51-61 (1968).
42. Smith, supra note 3, at 452-53; Smith, supra note 20, at 8-9.
43. Smith, supra note 2, at 39.
44. Court mean: 66.1. Sprague Criterion: 83.1. Voting blocs included: Souter, Ginsburg, &
Stevens at 93.5; Scalia & Thomas at 93.5; Rehnquist & O'Connor at 90.3; Rehnquist & Kennedy at
87.1; Souter & Breyer at 83.9; and Stevens & Breyer at 83.9.
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Table 6-Interagreement Percentages for Paired Justices in U.S.
Supreme Court Nonunanimous Criminal Justice Decisions, 1999-2000
Term45
ale 6 Ginsburg Stevens Breyer OConnor Kennedy Rehnquist Thomas [caliaouter 955 909 77.3 54.5 31.8 31.8 27.3 18.2
insburg 86.4 72.7 50.0 36.4 36.4 22.7 13.6
,tevens 
77 
.3 45 
.5 40 
.9 31 
.8 27 
.3 18 
.2
reyer 59.1 45.5 40.9 31.8 31.8
Connor 63.6 86.4 63.6 54.5
ennedy 81.8 68.2 59.1
tehnquist 68.2 59.1
omas 90.0
III. CASE DECISIONS
A. UNANIMOUS DECISIONS
The Court's most notable unanimous decision addressed the
landmark Warren Court precedent Terry v. Ohio.46 In Terry, the Court
permitted a police officer to stop and frisk suspicious people on the
street when certain indicators provided sufficient justification to make
the search and seizure "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 47
Foremost among these indicators was the officer's personal observation
of suspicious behavior that led him to reasonably conclude that criminal
activity was afoot and that the suspicious person was armed. 48 Such
searches were justified on the need to protect the safety of officers and
members of the public from armed individuals who appeared to be
planning or carrying out a crime. 49 In later cases, the Court altered the
prerequisites by, for example, permitting a frisk based on a tip from a
known informant rather than just an officer's own observations. 50 When
the Supreme Court took up the case of Florida v. J.L.51 in 1999-2000,
the possibility existed that the Justices would further reduce or eliminate
the circumstances that must exist before a stop-and-frisk can occur.
45. Court mean: 51.6. Sprague Criterion: 75.8. Voting blocs included: Souter, Ginsburg, &
Stevens at 90.9; Scalia & Thomas at 90.9; Rehnquist & O'Connor at 86.4; Rehnquist & Kennedy at
81.8; Souter & Breyer at 77.3; and Stevens & Breyer at 77.3.
46. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. Id. at 30-31.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), the informant's tip about a person seated in a car
carrying a gun and drugs led the officer to reach through the car window to seize the gun from the car
driver's waistband.
51. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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In Florida v. J.L., an anonymous caller told police that a young
African-American male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a
plaid shirt was carrying a weapon. 52 Officers went to the bus stop,
observed that one of the three African-American youths at the bus stop
was wearing a plaid shirt, and proceeded to frisk each young man. 53 The
young man wearing the plaid shirt had a handgun in his pocket that
served as the basis for criminal charges.5 4 The Florida Supreme Court
declared the search invalid because the police had no basis for trusting
the reliability of the anonymous telephone tip.55 Two state justices
dissented and asserted that the protection of officers and the public
required a "firearms exception" that would permit searches for and
seizures of guns based on anonymous tips alone. 56
The Justices unanimously affirmed the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court and thereby solidified Terry's fundamental premise that
police officers do not possess unlimited discretion to stop and frisk
people on the streets. 57 Justice Ginsburg's opinion on behalf of the
Court distinguished the instant case from two prior cases in which
informant's tips were accepted as the basis for a stop-and-frisk. 58 In one
prior precedent, the tip came from a known informant, thus providing an
indicator of reliability. 59 In the other case, the officers made further
observations that verified the tip's accuracy before conducting the
search. 60 By contrast, in the instant case there was no suspicious
behavior observed by the officers. 61 They conducted the search based
entirely on the anonymous tip of unproven reliability. 62 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that there might be other situations in
which indicators of reliability might provide the basis for a
stop-and-frisk resting on an anonymous tip. 63
The Justices had a consensus in support of individuals' claims in
three other cases. In Williams v. Taylor,64 the Justices agreed that a
52. Id. at 268.
53. Id.
54. He was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and being a minor unlawfully in posses-
sion of a firearm. Id. at 269.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 270-71.
59. Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)).
60. Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)). In Alabama v. White, prior to the search,
officers' observations confirmed the accuracy of an anonymous tip that predicted that a woman
carrying drugs would leave a specific location at a certain time and drive to another specified
location. 496 U.S. at 326.
61. J.L, 529 U.S. at 271.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
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habeas petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in a capital case
in which a juror, upon questioning by the judge during voir dire about
relationships with actors in the case, failed to inform the trial court that
she was acquainted with a deputy sheriff (her ex-husband) and the
prosecutor (her divorce attorney). 65 The two other cases concerned
statutory interpretation regarding federal statutes governing arson 66 and
firearms. 67
Among the cases in which there was a consensus favoring the
government's position, the most notable concerned Sixth Amendment
rights. In Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 68 the Court decided
that criminal appellants have no right to represent themselves in appeals.
In explaining the decision, Justice Stevens' opinion distinguished the
Martinez case from that of the claimant in Faretta v. California.69 The
Faretta decision established the principle that criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to represent themselves at trial. 70 The Court
distinguished Martinez by noting that the Sixth Amendment, which
provided the source of the Faretta right, applies only to trials and not to
criminal appeals. 71 Moreover, the Court concluded that the Due Process
Clause does not provide a right to self-representation. 72  Stevens'
opinion also noted that the Faretta decision reflected a long historical
tradition dating back to earlier eras in which few attorneys were available
to represent criminal defendants. 73 The opinion concluded that the same
tradition of self-representation did not exist with respect to appeals. 74
In United States v. Martinez-Salazar,75 the Court found neither
Sixth Amendment nor Due Process Clause violations when a defendant
was forced to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who should
have been excluded for cause when the defense attorney raised a
challenge during voir dire.76 A potential juror had indicated several
times during questioning that he would favor the prosecution. 77 Despite
this admission and protests from the defense, the trial judge refused to
remove him for cause. 78 Thus the defense expended one of its ten
65. Id. at 440-41.
66. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
67. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
68. 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
69. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
70. Id. at 836.
71. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 159.
72. Id. at 159-60.
73. Id. at 156-57.
74. Id. at 163.
75. 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
76. Id. at 317.
77. Id. at 308.
78. Id. at 309.
2001]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
allotted peremptory challenges to remove the potential juror.79 Justice
Ginsburg's opinion for the unanimous Court noted that defendants do
not have a Sixth Amendment right to use peremptory challenges. 80 The
Sixth Amendment provides a right to an impartial jury but peremptory
challenges are only auxiliary tools used to advance the goal of fulfilling
that right.81 According to Ginsburg, the defendant had the chance to
permit the pro-prosecution juror to be seated and then subsequently file
an appeal based on the trial judge's refusal to dismiss the juror for
cause. 82 Instead, the Court concluded that the defense had made a
conscious choice to use one of its peremptory Challenges, rather than
risk the uncertainty of an appeal on the issue of the judge's action in
refusing to dismiss the juror. 83 In the view of the Justices, the defense
was not compelled to use its peremptory challenge. 84
The other unanimous decisions with conservative outcomes involved
a variety of issues. One decision permitted defense attorneys to waive
time limits under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers without the
express consent of the defendant. 85 In another case, the Justices declined
to reduce an offender's period of supervised release by the amount of
time that the offender was erroneously incarcerated. 86 The remaining
unanimous decision permitted the default of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in habeas proceedings even when the claimant said that
ineffective assistance of counsel was the reason for the default. 87
B. THE 8-TO-1 DECISIONS
The Court's most highly publicized 8-to-i decision touched upon a
criminal investigation that grew out of the Whitewater scandal. 88 Webster
Hubbell, a close friend of President Clinton and a former law partner of
Hilary Clinton, pleaded guilty to mail fraud and tax evasion.8 9 As part
of his plea agreement, he promised to provide information to the
Whitewater Independent Counsel. 90 While Hubbell was in prison, the
Independent Counsel served a subpoena seeking additional documents
from Hubbell, but Hubbell asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege
79. Id.
80. Id. at 311.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 315.
83. Id. at 316.
84. Id. at 315.
85. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000).
86. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000).
87. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000).
88. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
89. Id. at 31.
90. Id.
[VOL. 77:1
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 1999-2000 TERM
against compelled self-incrimination in declining to respond.9 1 The
Independent Counsel obtained a court order directing Hubbell to re-
spond to the subpoena and granting him immunity to the extent allowed
by law. 92 The documents obtained in this fashion were used to indict
Hubbell on additional tax and fraud charges. 93 Hubbell challenged the
prosecution as a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.94
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that the
indictment must be dismissed. As Stevens observed:
In sum, we have no doubt that the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination protects the target of a grand jury in-
vestigation from being compelled to answer questions designed
to elicit information about the existence of sources of potential-
ly incriminating evidence. That constitutional privilege has the
same application to the testimonial aspect of a response to a
subpoena-seeking discovery of those sources. 95
Although the contents of the documents produced in response to
the subpoena did not constitute "compelled testimony" for Fifth
Amendment purposes, the act of producing those documents did
constitute "testimony." 96 Thus Hubbell's rights were violated when he
was forced to produce documents that were subsequently used as the
basis of a prosecution against him. 97 Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented
in the case.98
A concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
agreed that the Court had properly applied the doctrine of treating the
production of documents as testimony for Fifth Amendment purposes.99
However, the Court's two advocates of an originalist approach to consti-
tutional interpretation 100 argued that this doctrine may be inconsistent
with the Fifth Amendment's original meaningl 0' and therefore they ex-
pressed a willingness to reconsider the doctrine in a future case. 102 Thus
the Court's near-consensus in this case is somewhat illusory because the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 31-32.
95. Id. at 43.
96. Id. at 45-46.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 49.
99. Id.
100. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCAUA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE
MOMENT 31-32 (1993) (explaining Scalia's adoption of original intent analysis to constitutional
interpretation); Christopher E. Smith, Bent on Original Intent, 82 A.B.A. J. 48 (1996) (describing
Thomas' adherence to original intent analysis to constitutional interpretation).
101. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
102. Id.
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possibility clearly exists that Fifth Amendment doctrines could change if
the Court's composition changes, or if Thomas and Scalia convince their
colleagues to move in a new direction.
The Court's other 8-to-1 decision produced a conservative result by
interpreting a federal statute to provide U.S. district judges with the
authority to impose an additional time period of supervised release after
an offender has been returned to prison to serve out a sentence for
violating restrictions during an earlier release. 103 The decision provided
a good illustration that the labels "conservative" and "liberal" that are
generally applied to Justices do not always provide accurate predictions
about which Justices will support which results. Some issues will divide
Justices in ways that differ from the usual ideological patterns, and this
case obviously did so because Scalia was the lone Justice to adopt the
"liberal" position of supporting the individual's claim. Scalia harshly
criticized the Court's interpretation of certain words in the statute 104 and
seized the opportunity to chastise his colleagues for encouraging lower
court judges to make the law mean whatever the judge wants it to
mean. 10 5
C. THE 7-To-2 DECISIONS
Two of the most important "liberal" decisions of the Term pro-
duced 7-to-2 results. In the most highly publicized case, Dickerson v.
United States,106 the Court examined a Fourth Circuit decision declaring
that Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required and therefore
Congress can enact statutes 107 to free law enforcement officers from the
requirements of the Warren Court's 1966 landmark decision. 108 The
case was the product of a lengthy crusade by University of Utah law
professor Paul Cassell, 109 who represented a conservative legal founda-
tion in arguing the case before the Court when the Clinton admini-
stration declined to defend the Court of Appeals decision. The issue
provided the Supreme Court with a clear opportunity to overturn the
103. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000).
104. Id. at 716 n.l (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Thus, when the Court admits that it is giving the word
'revoke' an 'unconventional' meaning, it says that it is choosing to ignore the word 'revoke."').
105. Id. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision invites [lower court judges] to return to
headier days of not-too-yore, when laws meant what judges knew they ought to mean.").
106. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (stating that voluntariness, rather than the provision of Miranda
warnings, is the touchstone for determining the admissibility of incriminating statements obtained
during custodial questioning).
108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
109. Tony Mauro, Legal Renegade's Mission: Upend Enduring Decision, USA TODAY, Mar. I,
1999, at A1; Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998).
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landmark Miranda decision. However, the Court ultimately disappointed
Miranda's critics by strongly endorsing the Warren Court's landmark
decision as enunciating constitutionally-mandated rules for police
procedures.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion relied on the language
and reasoning of the Miranda precedent as well as considerations of
stare decisis to overrule the lower appellate court. 10 According to
Rehnquist:
Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and
its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the first
instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against
overruling it now. . . . Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture. . . . [O]ur subsequent
cases [after Miranda] have reduced the impact of the Miranda
rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the
decision's core ruling that unwarned statements may not be
used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief .... In sum,
we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that
Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule
of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. I I 1
Because a seven-member majority supported Rehnquist's opinion, critics
were put on notice that there is little reason to make further efforts to
overturn Miranda unless and until the Court's composition changes
significantly.
A strong dissenting opinion by Scalia, joined by Thomas, criticized
the Court sharply for its "judicial arrogance"1 2 in "imposing its Court-
made code upon the States." 11 3 Consistent with his penchant for
graphic language and strong condemnations of those with whom he
disagrees,"i 4 Scalia went so far as to question the sanity of people who
would support the judicial preservation of Miranda warnings:
Far from believing that stare decisis compels this result, I be-
lieve we cannot allow to remain on the books even a celebrated
decision-especially a celebrated decision-that has come to
stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court has power to
impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and the
110. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2348.
113. Id.
114. SMIH, supra note 100, at 60-67.
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States. This is not the system that was established by the
Framers, or that would be established by any sane supporter of
government by the people."l 5
The Dickerson decision was not entirely surprising. The Rehnquist
Court has appeared disinclined to overturn landmark precedents. Such
actions raise the risk of political mobilization and backlash that would
place the Justices in the unwanted position of being in the center of
explosive political debates. Instead, the Court has made incremental
changes and created exceptions to landmark rulings in order to give
police and prosecutors flexibility without being accused of wiping away
the famous decisions of the Warren Court. 116 Indeed, one commentator
has implicitly argued that conservative Justices have an incentive to
preserve liberal landmark precedents in order to give fellow conserva-
tives a focal point and motivation for continued political and legal
mobilization in pursuit of conservative policy goals. 117
By contrast, the Court's liberal decision in Bond v. United States 118
seems surprising. In Bond, a U.S. Border Patrol Agent squeezed the soft
luggage on the overhead rack of a Greyhound bus. 119 In one duffel
bag, he felt a brick-like object. 120 Bus passenger Bond admitted that he
owned the duffel bag, and he consented to a search of the bag.121 The
bag was found to contain a "brick" of methamphetamine.1 22 Bond was
convicted on drug charges. 123 He sought to suppress the introduction of
the drugs as evidence against him, arguing that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when the agent, with no basis for suspicion,
manipulated and squeezed the duffel bag. 124 In essence, Bond claimed
that the random squeezing of soft-sided luggage by law enforcement
officials looking for contraband constitutes an impermissible "unreason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment.125 On behalf of a seven-
member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that Bond's rights
were violated. 126  Rehnquist found that Bond had a reasonable
expectation of privacy when he placed his possessions in the duffel bag,
115. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2348.
116. Christopher E. Smith, Turning Rights into Symbols: The U.S. Supreme Court and Criminal
Justice, 8 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 99, 103-13 (1997).
117. Alexander, supra note 13, at 49 (describing the Miranda decision as a symbol for "the legal
system's favoritism of criminals and the need to right the unbalance").
118. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
119. Id. at 335.
120. Id. at 336.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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and that this expectation-and his Fourth Amendment rights-were
violated when the agent manipulated the bag.' 27 In dissent, Justice
Breyer, joined by Scalia, argued that bus passengers do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy because they must expect that their
soft-sided luggage will be touched and moved around in the course of
traveling by commercial transportation.1 28
The decision may be considered surprising because of com-
mentators' views that the Rehnquist Court "has placed the Fourth
Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures at the
bottom" of its hierarchy of priorities to be protected in the Bill of
Rights.129 Thus the Rehnquist Court has "decided cases affecting nearly
every aspect of Fourth Amendment issues, and in most cases the Court
either favored government by interpreting precedents in a conservative
manner or created new conservative interpretations of existing prece-
dents." 130 By declining to use the opportunity to further diminish the
scope of Fourth Amendment rights, the Court's decision runs counter to
the predominant trends in search and seizure cases during the Rehnquist
Court era. 13 1
The Court's other liberal decision with two dissenters was a habeas
corpus decision, 132 in which the majority concluded that a dismissal for
failure to exhaust state remedies did not constitute a first petition subject
to the successive petition defense. 133
The Court addressed various issues in its conservative decisions with
seven-member majorities. The Court found no First Amendment viola-
tion in limiting media access to arrestees' addresses. 134 In another case,
a prosecutor's summation challenged the credibility of a testifying
defendant by arguing that the defendant had the opportunity to tailor his
testimony after being present in the courtroom to hear the testimony of
the victim and other witnesses. 135 The majority rejected the defendant's
127. Id. at 338-39.
128. Id. at 340-43.
129. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER S LOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND CONCEPTS 4 (3d ed. 1993).
130. HENSLEY, SMITH, & BAUGH, supra note 16, at 448.
131. Id. at 450-51.
132. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
133. Procedural decisions of the Supreme Court, as well as the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, have provided additional bases for dismissal of habeas petitions. See, e.g.,
Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331 (1993). Although these changes
were intended to reduce the burden on courts and government lawyers who must handle habeas
petitions, the changes have sometimes made habeas processes more complex for judges and lawyers.
See Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Reform of Habeas Corpus: The Advocates' Lament, 44 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 47 (1996); Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Policy Making and Habeas Corpus Reform, 7 CRIM.
JUST. POL'Y REV. 91, 91 (1995).
134. L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
135. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000).
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subsequent claims that the prosecutor's comments violated the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation, the Fifth Amendment right to be
present at trial, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due, process.136
The final case in this category involved the interpretation of a bribery
statute. 137
D. THE 6-TO-3 DECISIONS
The Court's lone liberal decision in a 6-to-3 case involved the issue
of standards for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel and
interpretation of federal habeas statutes. 138 With respect to the central
issue concerning the right to counsel, the majority found that a defen-
dant's attorney provided unconstitutionally ineffective representation by
failing to present significant mitigating evidence in a capital case. 139
The conservative decisions in this category involved a variety of
issues. One case concerned the constitutionality of a Colorado statute
regulating leafleting outside of abortion clinics. 140 The majority found
no violation of the leafleteers' First Amendment rights. 141 The case pro-
vides an illustration of the limitations of the "liberal" and "conserva-
tive" labels. The issue of abortion may have cast a significant shadow
over the case. Thus "liberal" votes in favor of protecting anti-abortion
protesters' rights were cast by three of the Court's more conservative
Justices (Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy).
In another case, the Court found that changes in Georgia's schedule
of parole hearings did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause even though
many prisoners had to wait several extra years for each hearing. 142 The
Court also vacated and remanded an ineffective assistance of counsel
case after determining that an attorney need not always consult with a
defendant before failing to file a notice of appeal following an entry of a
guilty plea.143
136. Id. at 71-73, 75.
137. Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
138. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
139. Id. at 398-99.
140. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000).
141. Id. at 2499.
142. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000).
143. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
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E. THE 5-TO-4 DECISIONS
The Court examined the Terry doctrine in a case that divided the
Justices along their predominant jurisprudential fault line, with the five
most conservative Justices constituting the majority and the four most
liberal Justices in dissent. In Illinois v. Wardlow, 144 a man fled upon
seeing police officers drive into an area characterized as one known for
drug activities. Police stopped the man and found a handgun in his
possession when they frisked him.145 He was convicted on weapons
charges, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed his conviction because it
said that sudden flight does not create the required reasonable suspicion
to justify a Terry stop. 14 6 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 14 7
According to Rehnquist's majority opinion, when a person runs at
the sight of police officers in a high-crime area, officers have reasonable
suspicion to conduct a stop and frisk. 148 As described by Rehnquist:
"Headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion:
it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly sug-
gestive of such." 149 In effect, the Court adopted a totality-of-circum-
stances test that permits police officers to include flight as a significant
indicator of suspiciousness.
On behalf of four Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Stevens agreed with the majority that the Court should not adopt a per se
rule that either permits running away to justify a stop or precludes the
use of flight as a determining factor. 150 These four Justices disagreed,
however, with the majority's conclusion that the stop-and-frisk was
justified by the facts of this case. Stevens noted that the officer involved
in the stop testified that he could not remember whether he was in a
marked or unmarked car.151 Thus Stevens concluded that if the officers
were in unmarked cars, the record does not eliminate the possibility that
the defendant ran for his own reasons without knowing that police
officers were in the passing cars. 152 This scenario would counteract the
officers' underlying inference that he ran because police officers were
driving down the street. 153 According to Stevens: "I am not persuaded
144. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
145. Id. at 122.
146. Id. at 122-23.
147. Id. at 126.
148. Id. at 124-25.
149. Id. at 124.
150. Id. at 126.
151. Id. at 137.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 138.
2001]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEW
that the mere fact that someone standing on a sidewalk looked in the
direction of a passing car before starting to run is sufficient to justify a
forcible stop and frisk."15 4 It appeared that the four dissenters were
much more open than their colleagues to the possibility that people
could run down the street for innocent reasons. Indeed, Stevens even
endorsed the possibility that it is understandable for innocent people to
run when they see the police because of perceptions of police brutality
or because of the risk of harm to bystanders during police-citizen
encounters in some neighborhoods:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those resid-
ing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the
fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justi-
fication, believes that contact with the police can itself be
dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the
officer's sudden presence. For such a person, unprovoked
flight is neither "aberrant" nor "abnormal." Moreover, these
concerns and fears are known to the police officers themselves,
and are validated by law enforcement investigations into their
own practices. 155
Although the majority and dissenters agree on the desirability of a
totality-of-circumstances test, it is clear that their applications of the test
are quite different. The majority's application appears to be very
deferential to police discretionary judgments about suspiciousness and
potentially has wide applicability since stops can be triggered by people
running in areas labeled as "high crime" or "known for criminal activi-
ty." By contrast, the dissenters would not accept the factors of a
person's presence in a high crime area or a person's flight, alone or in
combination, as the primary basis for reasonable suspicion. Instead, the
dissenters would require detailed articulation of facts specific to each
situation to provide the basis for the Terry stop.
There is a risk that the Court's decision will open the door to a
variety of additional cases that test the contours of the Wardlow decision.
What if a person jogs away at the sight of the police? Rehnquist empha-
sized in Wardlow that the stop was triggered by "head-long flight," but
his rationale could be used to support stopping someone who is merely
jogging. What if the person merely walks away very quickly? What if
the person is not in a high crime area but is recognized by the police as
someone with a criminal record? Because of the majority's apparent
deference to the judgments of police officers on the street, it seems likely
154. Id. at 140.
155. Id. at 132-33.
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that stops could be justified in all of these circumstances. Much will
depend on the level of scrutiny and skepticism applied by lower court
judges who are confronted with motions to suppress evidence gained
from stop-and-frisk searches.
The most controversial 5-to-4 decision concerned the constitu-
tionality of state statutes criminalizing so-called "partial birth abor-
tions. ' 156 Justice O'Connor's concurrence provided the needed fifth
vote for the Court's four most liberal Justices to strike down Nebraska's
law. O'Connor agreed that the statute imposed an impermissible burden
on a woman's privacy-based right to make choices about terminating a
pregnancy. 157 The decision has limited impact on criminal justice. For
the moment, it prevents states from having laws like Nebraska's but that
situation could change with a new appointment to the Court. The case
serves as a reminder, however, of the intersections between criminal law
and other legal issues that are usually discussed as constituting separate
areas of law, such as the right to privacy.
In conservative decisions that deeply divided the Justices, a consis-
tent pattern emerged. In all seven cases, including Illinois v. Wardlow,
the five-member majority was composed of the Court's most conserva-
tive Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor, and Kennedy) who
squared off against the four most liberal members (Ginsburg, Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer). Thus these cases touched upon the deepest
ideological or jurisprudential faultlines that run through the Court.
In one conservative decision, the majority found that California has
adequate procedures for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in appellate cases. 158 In endorsing the California procedures, the
Justices indicated that states do not need to apply a single standard in
evaluating the constitutional adequacy of actions by appointed appellate
counsel. The Court determined in a different case that a defendant
cannot claim that evidence has been erroneously admitted at trial when
the defendant presented that evidence. 159  In two cases, the Court
endorsed the constitutional adequacy of capital jury instructions 160 and
another endorsed jury instructions in a robbery case by interpreting a
federal criminal statute. 161 Another decision rejected prisoners' argu-
ments in order to find that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
does not violate the separation of powers principle. 162
156. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
157. Id. at 2617.
158. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
159. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000).
160. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
161. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
162. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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An obvious difference between the Court's liberal and conservative
decisions that split the Court most closely is that at least one of the five
most conservative Justices must join a majority that produces five-
member decisions favoring liberal outcomes. However, the Stenberg
case concerning Nebraska's "partial birth" abortion statute was the only
instance in which a relatively conservative Justice (O'Connor) joined the
four most liberal Justices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) in
order to form a five-member majority. In the other two close cases
favoring individuals, the Justices divided in ways that differed from their
usual ideological alliances. In Apprendi v. New Jersey,163 conservatives
Scalia and Thomas joined Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg in deciding that
juries must decide if a crime is hate-motivated for purposes of sentence
enhancements. The judge cannot decide after the verdict that the crime
was motivated by hate. 164 Justices Scalia and Thomas joined their more
liberal colleagues Stevens, Souter, and Breyer to form a majority in
Carmell v. Texas.165 In that case, the Court decided Texas violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause by changing the applicable legal rules for
presenting evidence of sex crimes and then using these rules in a trial for
crimes that occurred before the rules were changed. 166 Justice Ginsburg,
who had one of the most liberal voting records in criminal justice cases,
wrote the dissenting opinion on behalf of conservatives Rehnquist,
O'Connor, and Kennedy. 167 Thus, during the 1999-2000 Term, cases
that activated the Court's most consistent ideological alliances nearly
always produced conservative results. Only once (Stenberg v. Carhart)
did the four most liberal Justices stay together when a conservative
Justice came to join them to form a five-member majority.
IV. CONCLUSION
Is it true that the contemporary Justices who comprise the most
frequent majorities on the Rehnquist Court are leading the law on a
"course [that] heads in almost exactly the reverse direction from the one
the Warren Court pursued in the 1960s[?]"1 68 While law enforcement
officials manifest few fears about the Supreme Court imposing new
constitutional requirements upon them,169 they also cannot expect the
Court to undo entirely the doctrines put into place by the Warren Court.
163. 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
164. Id. at 353-56.
165. 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
166. Id. at 552-53.
167. Id. at 553.
168. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBER 510 (1998).
169. Christopher E. Smith & John Hurst, The Forms of Judicial Policymaking: Civil Liability and
Criminal Justice Policy, 19 JUST. Sys. J. 341 (1997).
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 1999-2000 TERM
During the 1999-2000 Term, the Court reaffirmed the Warren Court
landmarks of Miranda v. Arizona and Terry v. Ohio. The Court created
new flexibility in undertaking Terry searches by treating flight as an
important element of suspicious behavior. 170 However, the decision in
Florida v. J.L. demonstrated that the Court has not abandoned the
underlying Terry principle that there must be a basis for reasonable
suspicion before such stops and frisks can be undertaken. 171
As in its prior terms, the Rehnquist Court Justices supported
individuals' claims in a substantial minority of cases. 172 Despite the
Rehnquist Court's deserved reputation for conservative decisions and
policy preferences, the dominance of conservative Justices does not
mean an absence of protection for constitutional rights. The scope of
the rights protected may be narrower than during the Warren Court
era, 173 but during the 1999-2000 Term the Rehnquist Court decided in
favor of individuals in cases concerning such issues as Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures, 174 Sixth Amendment ineffective
assistance of counsel, 175 ex post facto laws, 176 Miranda warnings, 17 7 and
the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 178
It should be noted that among the foregoing six case examples in which
the Court supported the protection of constitutional rights, Rehnquist
and Scalia were the most frequent dissenters. Yet each of them dissented
in only three of these cases, so it would not be accurate to say that any
Justices have shown absolute determination to make criminal
justice-related rights mere slogans rather than substantive protections.
On the other hand, it is quite clear from Table 3 that the Justices diverge
quite significantly in their visions of the Constitution's impact on
criminal justice and in their inclination to support legal claims asserted
by individual defendants and convicted offenders. When this evident
170. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
171. 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000).
172. See supra Table 1.
173. See WHITEBREAD, supra note 129, at 6.
A second noticeable trait exhibited by the Court since 1970 is its devotion to "totality of
circumstances" analysis as distinct from a rule-oriented approach to criminal procedure.
The Warren Court appeared to prefer the adoption of specific rules to guide law
enforcement officers, as well as the courts which evaluate their behavior. . . . In
practical terms, the end result of totality of circumstances analysis has been a relaxation
of constitutional restrictions on law enforcement.
Id.
174. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
175. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
176. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
177. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
178. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
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divergence is examined in light of the relatively large number of closely-
divided 5-to-4 decisions (ten out of thirty-one criminal decisions), it is
obvious that new appointments to the Court after the 2000 election may
have a significant impact on criminal justice in the very near future. A
change of one vote either might solidify or, alternatively, reverse the
Court's current position on a number of issues.
